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ABOUT THE SERIES 
Drawing on the systematic 
methodologies behind investigative 
journalism, open source intelligence 
gathering, big-data, criminology, and 
political science, this series maps the 
transnational corporate, legal and 
governmental structures employed by 
organisations and figures in Central 
Asia to accumulate wealth, influence 
and political power. The findings will 
be analysed from a good governance, 
human rights, and democratic 
perspective, to draw out the big picture 
lessons. 
Each instalment will feature a digestible 
analytical snapshot centring on a 
particular thematic, individual, or 
organisation, delivered in a format that 
is designed to be accessible to the public, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In an attempt to break from the past 
practices of the Islam Karimov regime, 
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and his 
government have vigorously promoted 
their pro-business credentials. They 
are delivering on this claim through an 
expansive programme of privatisation, 
deregulation and state aid. However, 
commentators have warned that if this 
process is choreographed by political 
decision makers in an environment 
fundamentally lacking in transparency, 
accountability, and impartiality there is a 
serious risk that an explicitly oligarchical 
system will emerge, bringing with it 
growing inequality and instability. 
Arguably a bellwether for the new 
Uzbekistan envisaged by President 
Mirziyoyev is the rising political figure, 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev. In addition 
to being the Mayor of Tashkent, 
Artikhodjayev is one of the country’s 
most successful businessmen having 
founded the Akfa and Artel groups. He 
embodies Mirziyoyev’s stated goal of 
a modernising nation administered by 
entrepreneurs. 
This Power Brief aims to examine how 
public and business integrity reforms are 
working in practice, using the Tashkent 
Mayor, and the business empire he 
founded as a case study. Drawing on 
new applications of data science and 
investigative techniques, this case 
study scrutinises how conflicts of 
interest, state aid, public procurement, 
freedom of information, and corporate 
transparency are being managed in 
practice.
There are some encouraging signs. For 
example, greater public engagement 
from senior officers in government and 
private enterprise was noted. So to were 
improvements in the depth and breadth 
of public data released by different state 
authorities. 
Despite these laudable improvements, 
the findings indicate that the current 
reform agenda still takes place in a high 
risk political environment. There is an 
absence of accessible, clear, transparent 
and objective criteria governing how 
businesses are selected to receive 
state aid, lucrative opportunities, and 
preferential treatment. More broadly 
speaking public decision making and 
public administration is not conducted 
in a transparent manner. Information on 
the beneficial ownership and financial 
standing of limited liability companies is 
also unavailable in Uzbekistan. There is 
a lack of robust procedure for declaring 
and managing conflicts of interest. 
While actively obtaining information 
that would allow procurement, conflicts 
of interest, and government decisions 
to be publicly scrutinised, remains an 
extremely challenging task despite 
freedom of information laws.
Since its transition from the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan’s government has cautiously 
developed a market based economy. It has been a politically overdetermined process, 
with little transparency or independent oversight. Business entities tied to influential 
political patrons or possessing powerful shadow owners, have enjoyed preferential 
access to state aid and market opportunities, while being largely exempt from state 
administered extortion rackets endured by competitors. 
I.
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Key findings with respect to the Akfa-
Artel group presented in this report 
include:
 The Akfa-Artel group uses nominee 
shareholders and directors, which 
serves to conceal from public view 
persons with significant control over 
entities within the consortium. In 
two notable instances key offshore 
entities have used an unlawful 
method to circumvent transparency 
requirements.
 Regular use is made of legal forms in 
offshore jurisdictions heavily criticised 
for their opaque qualities and minimal 
public reporting requirements. These 
entities have employed senior office 
holders implicated in major money 
laundering scandals and aggravated 
fraud.
 The Akfa-Artel group has received 
significant state aid, including tax 
‘holidays’, customs concessions, 
and the granting of public assets 
at zero-cost. Lucrative awards of 
economic assets and state aid are 
provided without open competition or 
transparent selection processes.
 The Akfa-Artel group’s founder 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev, in his 
capacity as Mayor of Tashkent, has 
been instructed to oversee ventures, 
and public-private partnerships, in 
which Akfa-Artel has a direct stake, 
despite serious conflicts of interest. 
These conflicts of interest were not 
recognised and as a consequence 
were not declared.
 Companies tied to the Akfa-Artel 
group invested in three of the eight 
lots making up the US$1.3 billion 
Tashkent City property development, 
using a layer of offshore companies 
that made determination of 
beneficial ownership impossible. 
The group is also tied to the general 
contractor appointed to oversee four 
of the eight lots.  
 The Mayor and certain entities within 
the Akfa-Artel group demonstrate a 
welcomed preparedness to engage 
on these issues, which creates a 
potential bridge for future reform 
efforts informed by dialogue with 
civil society.  
General findings relating to anti-
corruption policy and practice in 
Uzbekistan include:
 There are serious shortcomings 
in the law, policy and practice, 
governing the declaration and 
management of conflicts of interest.  
 There is a failure to systematically 
implement open, competitive and 
transparent public procurement, with 
decrees and regulations permitting 
exceptions to the requirements set 
out in Uzbekistan’s anti-corruption 
and public procurement laws.
 Benefits, assets, aid, and 
opportunities are awarded by 
government to particular business 
entities without a clear and 
transparent selection process.  
 Freedom of information remains 
limited in Uzbekistan despite legal 
protections. It is difficult to access 
basic information on government 
decision making, even through direct 
written and emailed requests to the 
departments concerned.
 There is a failure to consistently 
conduct public consultation on 
major public decisions that seriously 
impact on the rights and interests of 
citizens.
 There is an observed opposition 
within government to disclosing 
publicly information on the beneficial 
ownership of companies.    
 Uzbekistan’s system of corporate 
disclosure and transparency, is 
limited, and requires substantive 
reform if it is to meet international 
standards.    
In response to these findings a number 
of recommendations are made, 
which complement and reinforce 
recommendations recently made 
by the OECD, Global Witness and 
Uzbekistani civil society. Critically, 
Uzbekistan’s anti-corruption laws 
need to be consolidated through 
applied measures, that are designed 
to ensure there is full transparency, 
open competition, and regulatory 
compliance, within the public and 
private sector. This can be achieved, 
in part, by drawing on examples of 
good practice from other jurisdictions, 
including full and open online registers 
for corporate disclosure, public 
tenders, and the financial interests 
of senior public officer holders, 
strengthened through investment in 
compliance, prosecution and public 
reporting. There is also a clear need 
for systematic procedures that 
operationalise commitments made by 
the government in its anti-corruption 
and open government laws.  
Responsibility also falls on jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom and 
Singapore – that supply opaque 
offshore holding structures – to invest 
in more rigorous compliance cultures, 
including through the prosecution 
of those entities which violate 
regulations, alongside legal reform 
designed to tackle loopholes which 
frustrate transparency and integrity 
efforts. 
Finally, Uzbekistan in light of these 
recommendations should implement 
practical legal and administrative 
measures for managing conflicts of 
interest, and sanctioning those who fail 
to comply with the law, with accurate 
public data kept on compliance.
FINDINGS
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GOVERNMENTAL RED FLAGSCORPORATE RED FLAGS
  Opaque ownership structures
 Use of proxies
 Opaque finances




 Conflict of interest
 Failure to tender
 Lack of transparency
 Lack of open competition
 State aid provided to politically 
exposed entities 
 Limited open data
 Restrictions on freedom of 
information
 Weak regulations
 Human rights breaches
Table 1: The Risk Barometer
UZBEKISTAN... SHOULD 
IMPLEMENT PRACTICAL LEGAL 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES 
FOR MANAGING CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST, AND SANCTIONING 
THOSE WHO FAIL TO COMPLY WITH 
THE LAW, WITH ACCURATE PUBLIC 
DATA KEPT ON COMPLIANCE
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A FORK IN THE ROAD II.
Under its former President, Islam 
Karimov, Uzbekistan adopted a cautious 
path of transition from the Soviet Union. 
It has been marked by an authoritarian 
model of government, and a linked 
system of state choreographed market 
capitalism. Businesses with direct ties 
to centres of political power – whether 
purchased (bribery), cultivated through 
‘clan’ networks, secured through a 
shadow ownership arrangement, or a 
combination of the three – have enjoyed 
preferential access to the most lucrative 
ends of Uzbekistan’s emerging market 
economy, while being insulated from 
the worst effects of observed state 
administered extortion rackets. 
During the Karimov government’s final 
years, with its leader in poor health, 
many of the system’s most predatory 
dynamics accelerated, with state 
organised syndicates monopolising 
significant swathes of the economy, 
whilst also overseeing vast wealth 
extraction activities.1 Following his 
death in 2016, Islam Karimov was 
replaced by Shavkat Mirziyoyev as 
President. Mirziyoyev’s appointment 
was confirmed through a national 
election which was reported to have 
been ‘devoid of genuine competition’, 
according to OSCE observers.2 Since 
taking the Presidency, Mirziyoyev has 
helped to steady Uzbekistan’s political-
economy following the turbulence of the 
late Karimov era. Over the first two years 
of the Mirziyoyev Presidency the state 
has moderated to an extent the tight 
grip placed on the public by the national 
security apparatus. It has also instituted 
steps designed to stimulate greater 
public engagement. However, significant 
civil and political constraints remain in 
Uzbekistan’s political system.
The areas earmarked by the Mirziyoyev 
government for the most radical reform 
have tended to centre on the rights, 
interests, and operational environment 
of business. With strong international 
support, for example, the Uzbekistani 
government has embarked on an 
ambitious programme of privatisation 
and deregulation, pump primed by 
state aid which has been coupled to 
reforms that are designed to secure 
property rights, deter rent-seeking, and 
modernise the public administration. The 
shape and contours of this programme 
is set out in a large volume of state laws, 
regulations and decrees. 
The Mirziyoyev government’s agenda, 
has notably won praise from centres of 
liberal opinion, such as the Washington 
Post and New York Times.3 However,  
entrenched commentators have 
encouraged caution.4 Substantive reform 
of parliament, the public administration, 
the judiciary, markets, and business 
is needed, focusing on enhancing 
transparency, impartiality, competition, 
integrity, and the assurance of essential 
freedoms. Unless these reforms are 
prioritised there is a significant risk 
long-standing and deeply engrained 
systems of state-choreographed market 
activity will convert a pro-business 
agenda into an oligarchical system, 
where new centres of extreme business 
power emerge and are indebted to 
political patronage. 
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5  ‘Mirziyoyev explained why he appointed a businessman as a hokim of Uzbekistan’s capital’, Stan Radar, 2 May 2018, available online: http://stanradar.com/news/
full/29391-mirzieev-objasnil-pochemu-naznachil-predprinimatelja-hokimom-stolitsy-uzbekistana-.html(accessed 29 April 2019)
6  There is no explicit structure uniting Akfa or Artel. Nevertheless, they share common owners and linked infrastructure. As a result, the phrase Akfa-Artel group will 
be used in this report. 
Image 1: Artel is one of the largest household brands in Uzbekistan  
In light of these risks, there is a need to 
closely scrutinise emerging centres of 
business power, and how these centres 
of business power are interacting with 
government, to determine whether it 
replicates historical patterns that have 
proven so problematic. There is also 
a need to examine closely how good 
governance and integrity reforms are 
operating in practise. An instructive 
case study, in both respects, can be 
found in the Mayor of Tashkent, Jahongir 
Artikhodjayev, and the business empire 
he founded, which operates primarily 
under the Akfa and Artel brands. 
Artikhodjayev has experienced a rapid 
political ascendency. In 2017 he was 
appointed head of the public Directorate 
responsible for Tashkent City, a mega-
project at the centre of President 
Mirziyoyev’s vision for Uzbekistan. Then 
in April 2018, Artikhodjayev was made 
acting Mayor of Tashkent, a status that 
was confirmed in December 2018. His 
rise has been strongly championed 
by President Mirziyoyev, who has 
encouraged entrepreneurs to take seats 
in government.5
In parallel, the Akfa and Artel groups 
(herein Akfa-Artel group6), have 
experienced a period of notable 
business success, buttressed by state 
aid, including most controversially 
with the Tashkent City project. The way 
in which this complex relationship is 
being handled is arguably a bellwether 
case study of how successfully or 
unsuccessfully the current regime is 
breaking from past practices, marked 
as they were by opaque legal structures 
and opaque decision making processes 
behind which serious abuse of power 
took place. 
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all questions were responded to.
Table 2: Responses from public organisations7
Public Organisation No Response Partial Response Full Response
President’s Office x
Mayor’s Office x
Ministry of Health x
Tashkent City Directorate x
Companies House (UK) x
Drawing on a pioneering application 
of data science and open source 
investigative techniques to 
Uzbekistan, this Power Brief maps the 
intricate transnational organisational 
structure of this major business 
grouping, and interrogates the 
dilemma’s created by the granting of 
significant state aid to a politically 
exposed group, in an environment 
where transparency, freedom of 
information, and the management of 
conflicts of interest remain weak. 
It was discovered during this 
investigation that shares in some of 
the key corporate entities in the Akfa-
Artel group are owned by the Tashkent 
Mayor himself. Others are owned by, two 
closely interlinked business associates 
Abror Ganiyev and Ismail Israilov, his 
wife, and 18 opaque offshore entities, 
some of which are tied to individuals 
seemingly implicated in money 
laundering and fraud.
In total the investigation found 67 
incorporated entities in Uzbekistan 
linked to the Akfa-Artel group. While 
the Akfa-Artel group is commonly 
associated with windows, doors, and 
white goods (such as, fridges, stoves, 
microwaves, and washing machines), 
these linked local entities possess 
a range of interests. They include 
consumer electronics, television and 
radio, construction, private medical 
services, and heavy industry, to name 
just a few examples. 
Cross-matching this corporate data 
with public administration data-sets, 
revealed that the Akfa-Artel group have 
enjoyed notable success in public-
private initiatives which are the direct 
political responsibility of the Tashkent 
Mayor and his administration. It was 
also revealed that recent government 
decrees have awarded companies 
within the group state aid and 
preferential treatment, under opaque 
conditions, without a sufficiently robust 
process to manage conflicts of interest 
or assure value for money through 
open competition. Compounding 
matters, in some instances the 
entities linked to the Akfa-Artel group 
employed nominee shareholders, 
which made it impossible to determine 
the ultimate beneficiaries of their 
business operations in Uzbekistan. 
During the investigation, Uzbekistan’s 
freedom of information laws were 
employed in an effort to obtain 
critical information on procurement 
and selection processes. Requests 
were put for information to the 
Mayor’s Office, the public Directorate 
responsible for the Tashkent City 
property development, the Ministry of 
Health and the President’s office, the 
results of which are set out in Table 2. 
Additionally, attempts were made to 
obtain information from companies 
which featured in the business 
transactions and ventures under 
analysis, the results are set out in Table 
3. Table 2 and 3 point to the significant 
work that still needs to be done in 
securing an open public and business 
environment in Uzbekistan.   
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Table 3: Responses from private organisations8






Wynex Innovation LLP X
Grandes Investment Group LP X
MacMerry Management LP X
Worldpoint Sales Limited X
Dream World Development X
On a positive note, the Uzbekistani 
state’s commitment to open data 
registries and public information, has 
created new opportunities for civil 
society and the research community to 
analyse government and market activity. 
While there remains considerable 
work to do in expanding open data in 
Uzbekistan and ensuring all data-sets 
are accessible, the growing number of 
registries and databases available online 
is a welcomed current. This investigation 
also benefited from the willingness 
of some public and private agencies 
to engage with challenging questions 
relating to transparency and public 
integrity. While the findings presented 
in this Power Brief do point to significant 
cleavages in the reform process, 
evidence was observed of an emerging 
space for challenging conversations.
To exhibit the key finding this Power Brief 
will set out a number of examples where 
the dilemmas identified were acutely 
demonstrated, focusing on urban 
redevelopment projects in Tashkent, and 
health sector privatisation efforts. A section 
will also be devoted to documenting the 
problematic transnational legal structure 
employed by the Akfa-Artel group. 
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UZBEKISTAN’S ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW
Anti-corruption legislation was passed by the Legislative Chamber and Senate in late 2016 and signed off 
by President Mirziyoyev. It forbids the abuse of public office for private gain, champions transparency and 
open competition, establishes procedures for managing conflicts of interest and confirms the integral 
role civil society and the media play in combatting corruption. Key provisions include:
ARTICLE 3 – In the current law the 
following main terms are used. 
corruption – unlawful use by a person 
of his official position for the purpose 
of obtaining material or non-material 
benefits in personal interests or in 
the interests of other persons or the 
unlawful provision of such benefit
corruption offense – an act with signs 
of corruption, by committing which the 
person is liable under the law 
conflict of interests – a situation in 
which the personal interest (direct or 
indirect) affects or may affect the proper 
performance of official duties and in 
which a conflict occurs or might occur 
between personal interests and the 
rights and lawful interests of citizens, 
organisations, society or the state. 
ARTICLE 21 – Measures to prevent and 
resolve conflicts of interests. 
Employees of state institutions should 
not allow personal interest during the 
performance of their official duties, 
which leads or may lead to a conflict of 
interest.
In the event if a conflict of interest 
occurs, the employees of state 
institutions should immediately inform 
their direct manager. The manager, who 
receives information about the presence 
of a conflict of interest, is obliged to take 
timely measures to prevent or resolve it.
Special units or commissions on 
ethics of state institutions monitor the 
compliance with the rules for resolving 
conflicts of interest.
Employees of state institutions, as well 
as their managers, who have allowed for 
the violation of the 
requirements of preventing or resolving 
conflicts of interest, are held liable in 
accordance with the law.
ARTICLE 22 – Measures to prevent 
corruption in the field of administrative 
procedures.
Measures to prevent corruption in the 
field of administrative procedures are:
• ensuring the principles of legality 
and justice, creating guarantees of 
the impartiality of the administrative 
and managerial process, increasing 
its transparency and accessibility for 
external and internal controls
• detailed regulation of administrative 
procedures with limited discretionary 
powers, prevention of bureaucratic 
formalism
• introduction of simplified 
administrative procedures;
• the establishment of effective 
mechanisms for appealing against 
decisions of state institutions and 
compensation for damage caused.
• Legislation may also provide other 
measures to prevent corruption in the 
field of administrative procedures.
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ARTICLE 23 – Measures to prevent 
corruption in the field of public 
procurement.
Measures to prevent corruption in the 
field of public procurement are:
• ensuring the transparency and 
availability of information on public 
procurement procedures
• ensuring fair competition and the use 
of objective criteria during decision-
making
• the creation of an effective system of 
internal control, as well as procedures 
for appealing and challenging the 
results of public procurement
• ensuring the effective functioning of 
public electronic trading
• Legislation may also provide for other 
measures to prevent corruption in the 
field of public procurement.
ARTICLE 31 – Access to information. 
• Everyone has the right to access 
information on the organization and 
on functioning of state institutions, 
on the processes of adopting acts 
relating to this person or group of 
persons
• State institutions, institutions of self-
government of citizens, non-state 
non-profit and other organizations 
provide mass media with reports on 
events, facts, events and processes 
related to corruption of public interest 
in the manner established by law
• Access to information may be 
restricted only in accordance with the 
law.
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During Jahongir Artikhodjayev’s rapid 
political ascendency in Uzbekistan, 
arguably it has been the controversial 
US$1.3 billion property development, 
Tashkent City, which has put the 
most visible spotlight on the overlap 
between his private and public 
portfolios. Tashkent City is a major 
urban redevelopment project situated 
in the heart of Uzbekistan’s capital.9 
It is being organised and overseen 
by the government in collaboration 
with private investors. This public-
private initiative has been vocally 
championed by the President himself. 
Mirziyoyev has promised to personally 
oversee construction efforts. 
The project is managed on a day-to-day 
basis by a public Directorate, established 
under a 2017 Cabinet of Ministers 
resolution.10 In addition to attracting 
and supporting private investors for 
Tashkent City, the public Directorate 
is responsible for coordinating design 
and construction activity. The property 
development is divided into eight lots. 
Each lot has a designated investor 
or investors, a designer, and general 
contractor responsible for construction 
efforts. Tashkent City once completed 
will consist of residential complexes, 
retail, business and financial districts, 
Hilton and Radisson branded hotels, 
a Congress Centre, and a large 
recreational park boasting a 7D cinema, 
planetarium and wax museum.
TASHKENT CITY: SHADOW OWNERS AND CAPITAL OF UNKNOWN ORIGINS
Image 2: Tashkent City construction efforts are ongoing in the capital 
9 ‘“With the Tashkent City project we must declare ourselves” – President’, Gazeta, 30 October 2017, available online: https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/10/30/tashkent-
city/(accessed 15 April 2019)  
10 ‘On Measures to Improve the Architectural Appearance and Improvement of the Central Part of the City of Tashkent, As Well as the Creation of Appropriate 
Conditions for the Population and Guests of the Capital’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Regulation, No.559, 28 July 2017, available online: http://
lex.uz/ru/docs/3295075(accessed 29 April 2019)
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However, analysis produced by 
journalists and researchers, reveal less 
sanguine sides to this mega-project. 
Investigations reveal that investment 
for this major public-private initiative 
is being sourced, in part, from opaque 
origins abroad.11  While the official 
charged with public responsibility for the 
project, Jahongir Artikhodjayev, appears 
to have a private interest in the venture.12 
Research has also uncovered evidence 
that residents impacted by this mega-
project were illegally displaced, without 
adequate notice or compensation.13 
Figure 1: Tashkent City - Investors and Contractors (Sources: Government of Uzbekistan Business Register, Government of 
Uzbekistan Corporate Information Portal, Tashkent City Directorate, United Kingdom Companies House).
11 Open Democracy Investigations, ‘Phantom foreign investors for an open new Uzbekistan’, Open Democracy, 21 December 2018, available online: https://www.
opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tashkent-city-project-uzbekistan-phantom-foreign-investors/ (accessed 13 March 2019); Open Democracy Investigations, ‘The 
strange connections of Tashkent City’s “British investor”’, Open Democracy, 21 February 2019, available online: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strange-
connections-of-tashkent-city-s-british-investor/ (accessed 13 March 2019)
12  Lasslett, K. ‘Uzbekistan Ltd: private-public interests clash in flagship project’, Open Democracy, 29 January 2019, available online: https://www.opendemocracy.
net/en/odr/uzbekistan-ltd/ (13 March 2019)
13   Akhmedov, A. ‘Dispossession and urban development in the new Tashkent’, Open Democracy, 21 December 2018, available online: https://www.opendemocracy.
net/en/odr/dispossession-and-urban-development-in-the-new-tashkent/ (accessed 14 March 2019); Bennetts, M. ‘Evicted without warning: Sudden Tashkent 
demolitions spark anger’, The Guardian, 2 April 2019, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/apr/02/evicted-without-warning-demolitions-
spark-activism-in-tashkent-uzbekistan (accessed 15 April 2019); Matyakubova, D. ‘Nation branding, social classes and cultural heritage in Uzbekistan’, Central 
Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, 10 April 2019, available online: https://analytics.cabar.asia/en/nation-branding-social-classes-and-cultural-heritage-in-
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This has prompted a number of questions. 
How entrenched are the Mayor’s private 
interests in Tashkent City? Was the 
selection of investors and contractors 
conducted in a fair, open, transparent, 
and competitive manner? How much 
state aid, including zero cost grants of 
public assets, is being channelled into 
this property development? What checks 
have been conducted to ensure the 
project is not being used for improper 
purposes, such as, money laundering? 
And finally, have residents displaced 
by this mega-development received 
fair treatment that accords with 
international human rights standards?
Answers to these questions have been 
difficult to come by. A request was put 
to the Tashkent City Directorate for 
the project’s masterplan, environment 
impact statement, planning documents, 
community consultation documents, 
and planning permission records.  
The Directorate responded: ‘The website 
of the project… contains information 
about Tashkent City master plan, which 
you can get familiar with on the website 
www.tcibc.uz. It also contains materials 
about construction plans and their impact 
on the environment’. Following revisions 
to the project website in April 2019, 
there is a 6 page environmental impact 
statement. The website does not contain 
a masterplan, planning documents, 
community consultation documents or 
planning approval documents. 
Little information either has been 
publicly disclosed by the Tashkent City 
Directorate on procurement and tenders, 
or how state aid has been channelled to 
private entities involved in the property 
development.14  It may well be that no 
tender documents exist for general 
contractors or designers selected to 
implement each of the eight lots making 
up the project. For example, the Cabinet 
of Ministers resolution establishing 
Tashkent City, allows the responsible 
public Directorate to enter into contracts 
for design and construction without 
tender.15  This measure increases the 
corruption risks during project 
procurement, and conflicts with anti-
corruption and public procurement laws 
passed during 2016-18. 
With respect to investors, under Article 
8 of the regulations governing Tashkent 
City it states that investors would be 
selected through tender.16 Article 8 
promises that the tender process and 
criteria would be set out in bespoke 
regulations. No new regulations could 
be found in the national legal database. 
The Mayor’s Office and Tashkent City 
Directorate confirm that investors were 
selected by an Administrative Council set 
up under the originating 2017 decree.17 
The Administrative Council consists 
of the Prime Minister, First Deputy 
Prime Minister, Ministers for Finance, 
Economics, Justice, Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Trade, and Internal Affairs, 
Chairmen and Directors of various state 
committees and public enterprises, 
the Mayor of Tashkent and the Head of 
the public Directorate responsible for 
Tashkent City. Requests for investor bid 
and selection documents were denied. 
The Mayor’s Office claims: ‘Administrative 
Council documents relating to the 
approval of investors are internal 
documents for official use, and therefore, 
we are not able to give them to you’. 
Failure to provide key documents 
on the venture – both planning and 
procurement – appears to contravene 
freedom of information obligations 
placed on public authorities set out in 
Article 31 of the Anti-Corruption Law 
and Article 7 of the 2014 law, On the 
Openness of the Activities of Public 
Authorities and Management.
Some further information on Tashkent 
City, however, was disclosed at a press 
conference organised by the Mayor of 
Tashkent in January 2019. At the press 
conference Artikhodjayev acknowledged 
links with Akfa, a company listed as the 
investor in Lot 5 of Tashkent City, which 
includes a 5-star hotel and congress 
centre.18  The Mayor also responded to 
broader concerns raised over key investors 
in Tashkent City using opaque offshore 
entities. Artikhodjayev argued, ‘if we ask 
the beneficiary for each investor, we can 
close the gates of Uzbekistan, nobody 
will come here’.19  The Tashkent City 
Directorate confirmed in correspondence, 
‘the release of this information  
[beneficial ownership] is not envisaged’.20 
14 See http://tcibc.uz/
15 Article 3, ‘On Measures to Improve the Architectural Appearance and Improvement of the Central Part of the City of Tashkent, As Well as the Creation of Appropriate 
Conditions for the Population and Guests of the Capital’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Regulation, No.559, 28 July 2017, available online: http://
lex.uz/ru/docs/3295075 (accessed 29 April 2019)
16 ‘On Measures to Improve the Architectural Appearance and Improvement of the Central Part of the City of Tashkent, As Well as the Creation of Appropriate 
Conditions for the Population and Guests of the Capital’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Regulation, No.559, 28 July 2017, available online: http://
lex.uz/ru/docs/3295075(accessed 29 April 2019)
17 Ibid.  
18 ‘Jahongir Artikhodjayev: management in Akfa has already been transferred to other persons’, Uz Report, 31 January 2019, available online: https://uzreport.news/
society/djahongir-artikhodjaev-upravlenie-v-akfa-uje-peredal-drugim-litsam (accessed 13 March 2019)
19  ‘“It doesn’t matter when a company is created” - hokim about investors Tashkent City’, Gazeta, 31 January 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/01/31/investors 
(accessed 13 March 2019)
20 Letter from B Rizaev, Deputy Director, Tashkent City Directorate, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.
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Taking this approach to due diligence 
and transparency exposes Uzbekistan 
to a range of risks including money 
laundering and corruption. Tashkent 
City Lot 3 offers an instructive example. 
An Open Democracy investigation 
discovered that the owner of Tashkent 
City’s biggest foreign investor, Hyper 
Partners GmbH – which is providing 
US$400 million21 – is a teenager, 
Mustafa Palvan.22  Authorities have 
failed to explain how a teen could source 
nearly half a billion dollars. It does not 
necessarily follow that Hyper Partners 
GmbH investment comes all, or in part, 
from illicit origins. The risk though 
of a revelation coming to light that is 
extremely damaging to Uzbekistan’s 
fragile reputation is heightened when 
red flags like this are ignored. 
Opaque corporate structures not only 
shield high risk financial transactions 
from the public spotlight, they also 
potentially conceal conflicts of interest. 
This has become another topic of 
importance with respect to Tashkent 
City, given the alleged involvement of the 
Akfa-Artel group in a mega-project that 
falls within the public portfolio of the 
group’s founder, Jahongir Artikhodjayev.
For example, the single biggest 
beneficiary of construction contracts is 
Discover Invest LLC. 
Discover Invest has been appointed 
general contractor on four of the eight 
lots making up Tashkent City according 
to information published on the 
Directorate’s website during 2018. When 
the Tashkent City Public Directorate was 
asked about the high number of general 
contracts awarded to a single company, 
they replied: ‘Regarding the statement 
that most of the contracts have been 
signed with Discover Invest LLC, we want 
to stress that it is not true’.23 The public 
Directorate claims in a letter dated 25 
April 2019, Discover Invest LLC was only 
awarded contracts for two of the eight 
lots. However, web archive data kept by 
the Wayback Machine clearly shows that 
the public Directorate issued information 
in 2018 stating Discover Invest LLC was 
the general contractor on lots 1, 4, 7 and 
8. Information on general contractors 
was then removed from the Tashkent 
City for lots 1 and 7 during April 2019.  
Information collated using Uzbekistan’s 
business register during February-March 
2019 indicates that Discover Invest LLC is 
tied into the Akfa-Artel group structure. 
Company stock is formally owned by 
“Ganiyev Abror Axralovich” (86.18%), 
and “Xakimov Sobirjon Kabildjanovich” 
(13.82%).24
21 ‘On Additional Measures to Attract Foreign Direct Investment in the Infrastructure Development of the City of Tashkent’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, Regulation, No.4, 4 January 2019, available online: http://www.lex.uz/docs/4138936 (accessed 14 March 2019)
22 Open Democracy Investigations, ‘Phantom foreign investors for an open new Uzbekistan’, Open Democracy, 21 December 2018, available online: https://www.
opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tashkent-city-project-uzbekistan-phantom-foreign-investors/ (accessed 13 March 2019)  
23 Letter from B Rizaev, Deputy Director, Tashkent City Directorate, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.
24 Discover Invest LLC, Company Extract, 002784-05, accessed 13 March 2019.
Image 3: Seeing behind the facade of Tashkent City has proven difficult
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Discover Invest’s majority shareholder, 
Abror Ganiyev, according to the 
February-March 2019 data-set, jointly 
owns at least four companies with 
Jahongir Artikhodjaev, co-owns a further 
three companies in the Akfa-Artel group 
(at least three), has been identified 
as an executive in two Akfa-Artel 
linked entities, was recently appointed 
Chairman of Akfa’s Board of Directors,25  
while the registered address for 
Discover Invest is the same as J-United 
Group, a key holding company 100% 
owned by the Mayor of Tashkent.26  It is 
unclear whether Ganiyev is the ultimate 
beneficiary of this stock-holding, or a 
nominee shareholder who works on 
behalf of an undisclosed third party. A 
request for clarification from Ganiyev 
was not responded to.
25 ‘In Artel, Akfa, Akfa Medline, Crafers and Mediapark, the chairs of the board of directors have changed’, Gazeta, 20 March 2019, available online: https://www.
gazeta.uz/ru/2019/03/20/akfa-group/(accessed 30 April 2019)
26 J-United Group, Company Extract, 25132, accessed 14 March 2019.
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27 High Land City LLC, Company Extract, 597138, accessed 19 May 2019.
28 Without a public register of beneficial owners in the jurisdictions concerned (UK and Singapore), there is no way of verifying that the ultimate beneficiaries of these 
companies are in fact foreign citizens. 
29 Techno Continental, Company Extract, 569933, accessed 19 May 2019.
30 ‘A new joint venture for the production of mobile phones created in FIEZ “Navoi”’, Gazeta, 4 July 2015, available online: https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2015/07/04/
phones/ (accessed 15 March 2019)
31 Wynex Innovation LLP, Accounts, Companies House, 22 March 2016, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC393843/ (accessed 15 
March 2019)
32 Wynex Innovation LLP, Accounts, Companies House, 24 October 2018, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC393843/ (accessed 19 
May 2019)
Image 4: Construction activity Tashkent City 
Following new corporate identifier 
information uncovered by the author 
in May 2019, it became possible to 
scrutinise the investors in Tashkent City. 
The investor in lot 1 of Tashkent City - 
described by the Directorate as a foreign 
investor - is High Land City LLC.27  High 
Land City LLC was incorporated on 5 April 
2018. Data on Uzbekistan’s business 
register indicates foreign investors only 
have a minority share in the company. 
The foreign28  minority stakeholders hold 
their stock in High Land City through 
two Uzbekistani joint-stock companies. 
Techno Continental has an 8.19% interest 
in High Land City, while Next Generation 
Product has an 8.17% stake. Stock in 
Techno Continental and Next Generation 
Product, in turn, are owned by opaque 
offshore entities. For example, Techno 
Continental, which was registered in 
Uzbekistan on 27 January 2018, is 100% 
owned by Wynex Innovation LLP an 
English Limited Liability Partnership 
registered on 19 June 2014.29 
Wynex Innovation was reported in 2015 
to be spearheading a joint venture that 
would manufacture mobile phones 
through a US$2 million investment with 
Infinity Electronics, a local company 
producing consumer electronics under 
the Artel Brand.30 At the time it had 
no declared assets, and an operating 
net loss of £419.31  In its latest annual 
accounts for 2018 Wynex Innovations 
declares its principal activity is ‘cargo 
forwarding agent as well as trade of 
household appliances and received 
commission’.32  It has no reported 
income, and an operating loss of £1,500. 
Wynex Innovations states it has £300 in 
cash. 
Next Generation Product’s registered 
email address is @artelgroup.org. It is 
owned by MacMerry Management LP 
(50%), a Scottish Limited Partnership 
registered on 23 October 2012, and 
Singapore Syndicate Group International 
Pte Ltd (50%), a Singaporean 
company which was incorporated on 
9 March 2012. Under their respective 
regulatory regimes, neither MacMerry 
Management, Singapore Syndicate 
Group or Wynex Innovations have to 
publicly declare beneficial owners (the 
UK has implemented a more limited 
significant control register, see section 
VI). Therefore, it is impossible to 
determine who are the ultimate owners 
of these foreign companies investing in 
Tashkent City Lot 1 through High Land 
City LLC. 
However, according to Uzbekistan’s 
business register the largest 
shareholder in High Land City LLC is in 
fact an individual, Ismail Israilov. He has 
an 81.24% share in the firm. 
Like Ganiyev, Israilov is a key player in 
the Akfa-Artel group. According to data 
collated from Uzbekistan’s Business 
Register in February-March 2019, he 
is, for instance, listed as the Manager 
of Akfa Engineering and Management, 
a firm at the time 100% owned by 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev. In addition to 
this, this data-set revealed that Israilov 
co-owns at least four companies with 
Artikhodjayev, he is sole stockholder 
in six companies linked to the Akfa-
Artel group, and co-owns at least four 
companies with Abror Ganiyev. It is 
unclear whether Israilov is the ultimate 
beneficiary of this stock-holding, or a 
nominee shareholder who works on 
behalf of an undisclosed third party. 
Requests for clarification from Mr 
Israilov were not responded to.
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Israilov appears again in lot 7 of 
Tashkent City. According to the Tashkent 
City public Directorate lot 7 will feature 
nine mixed-use buildings, constructed 
through investment provided by three 
local companies, one of which is 
Premium Village LLC.33  Premium Village 
LLC was registered on 22 August 2017. 
It shares a registered address with 
Artel Engineering and Management LLC. 
Premium Village’s current shareholders 
include Ismail Israilov (23.28%), in 
addition to Quality Electronics (37.20%) 
(a company registered on 4 January 
2018), Asia Electron (28.51%) (a company 
registered on 19 July 2017), and Factory 
of Technologies (9.30%) (a company 
registered on 13 April 2018). Both Quality 
Electronics and Factory of Technologies 
use @artelgroup.org as their registered 
email address.34  Asia Electron’s gmail 
account is the same used by Dream 
Production, a company owned by the 
Mayor, Jahongir Artikhodjayev.35  
33 Premium Village LLC, Company Extract, 538977, accessed 19 May 2019.
34 Quality Electronics, Company Extract, 561905, accessed 19 May 2019; Factory of Technologies, Company Extract, 600187, accessed 19 May 2019. 
 35 Asia Electron, Company Extract, 533066, accessed 19 May 2019; Dream Production LLC, Company Extract,  1304, accessed 19 May 2019.
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Quality Electronics, Asia Electron and 
Factory of Technologies are each 50% 
owned by MacMerry Management LP.36  
The other 50% of Quality Electronics and 
Asia Electron is owned by Commerce 
Standard Pte Ltd, a Singaporean 
company incorporated on 11 June 2012. 
While the remaining 50% in Factory of 
Technologies is owned by Singapore 
Syndicate Group International Pte Ltd.
MacMerry Management LP and the 
Singapore Syndicate Group were also 
part of the ownership structure for High 
Land City LLC, the investor in lot 1. For 
the reasons already noted, no beneficial 
owner could be identified for any of 
these three investors. However, all three 
firms are tied into the Akfa-Artel group 
structure. 
Given its corporate name, the investor 
in Tashkent City lot 5, Akfa Dream World 
would appear a more straightforward 
example of a company tied to the Akfa-
Artel group. However, it was impossible 
to access Akfa Dream World’s business 
register record, owing to search 
restrictions placed on the database.37  
The shareholders in this company, 
therefore, could not be comprehensively 
identified. However, an examination 
of joint stock company disclosures 
revealed that Akfa Dream World is part 
owned (20.4%) by Perfect Plast Profil, 
a corporation tied to the Akfa-Artel 
group.38  
Perfect Plast Profil’s stock is owned 
by the Esperansa Group LP, a Scottish 
Limited Partnership registered on 13 
April 2016. Under recent transparency 
reforms Scottish Limited Partnerships 
must declare persons or entities with 
significant control (PSC) (see section VI). 
Esperansa Group LP has declared one 
PSC,39  Esperansa Incorporated LP, an 
English Limited Partnership registered 
on 6 October 2017. Limited Partnerships 
in England do not need to declare PSCs. 
Under the transparency reforms, it is 
unlawful to declare opaque forms such 
as this as a PSC (see section VI).  
36 Quality Electronics, Company Extract, 561905, accessed 19 May 2019; Asia Electron, Company Extract, 533066, accessed 19 May 2019; Factory of Technologies, 
Company Extract, 600187, accessed 19 May 2019.
37 In order to access company extracts on Uzbekistan’s official business register users require the firm’s tax identification number. This can be acquired on some 
occasions through open source databases. Where it is unavailable, the researcher can ask the company, but may not receive a reply. In the case of Akfa Dream 
World, there was no company website or contact details listed in the Yellow Pages. Requests for the tax identification number made to the Tashkent City Directorate 
and the Akfa group were not responded to. 
38 Perfect Plast Profile, Conclusion of Transaction with Affiliated Persons, 11 April 2019, available online: https://openinfo.uz/ru/facts/25860/(accessed 19 May 2019)
39 Esperansa Group LP, Notification of a Person with Significant Control, Companies House, 12 October 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/SL025982/persons-with-significant-control (accessed 19 May 2019) 
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Image 5: Dream City has marshalled an expansive retail campaign for Tashkent City
Then there is the question of the 
subcontractors that have been employed 
by investors selected to lead on the 
different lots. For example, the company 
Durable Beton LLC claims it is a key 
supplier of concrete to the US$1.3 billion 
dollar development.40  At the time the 
data-set was compiled in March 2019, 
its stock was owned by Ismail Israilov.41  
If we turn to the enterprises involved 
in handling property sales at Tashkent 
City, a prominent player is Dream City. 
No corporate record could be found for 
this entity. However, its website domain 
is registered to J-United Group, and its 
contact address is admin@akfa.uz.42 
It will be recalled J-United Group is 100% 
owned by Artikhodjayev.
In summary, the data indicates that 
companies linked into the Akfa-Artel 
group structure are investors in three 
of the eight lots making up Tashkent 
City, and have been appointed general 
contractor on four of the eight lots 
according to information published 
in 2018. Because these interests, in 
part, are layered through opaque 
offshore structures it is impossible 
to determine the beneficial owners. 
Compounding matters, the local 
stockholders, who are managers within 
the Akfa-Artel group, did not respond 
to queries submitted on the nature of 
their interests. However, the business 
register data at the very least suggests 
that Ganiyev and Israilov are business 
partners of Tashkent’s Mayor.   
This triggers a number of concerns, 
once mapped against Uzbekistan’s 
anti-corruption law.  
For example, has the Mayor of Tashkent 
made a full and frank disclosure of 
any direct or indirect interest he has in 
companies benefiting from the Tashkent 
City development? Has Jahongir 
Artikhodjayev disclosed any other 
conflicts of interest he may possess, 
such as direct business relations with 
key parties selected to benefit from 
the project? Did these relevant parties 
and companies they own obtain their 
stakes in Tashkent City, through an open, 
transparent and competitive process? 
40 ‘Concrete mixes and concrete products from Durable Beton’, Stroyka, 31 January 2019, available online: https://stroyka.uz/publish/doc/text147843_betonnye_
smesi_i_betonnaya_produkciya_ot_durable_beton (accessed 14 March 2019)
41 Durable Beton LLC, Company Extract, 008101-5, accessed 14 March 2019.
42 Verified via https://www.whois.net
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43  Letter from E Iminov, Head of Administration Tashkent Mayor’s Office, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.  
44 Akhmedov, A. ‘Dispossession and urban development in the new Tashkent’, Open Democracy, 21 December 2018, available online: https://www.opendemocracy.net/
en/odr/dispossession-and-urban-development-in-the-new-tashkent/ (accessed 14 March 2019)
45 Bennetts, M. ‘Evicted without warning: Sudden Tashkent demolitions spark anger’, The Guardian, 2 April 2019, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/
cities/2019/apr/02/evicted-without-warning-demolitions-spark-activism-in-tashkent-uzbekistan(accessed 15 April 2019);
Do the contract prices represent value 
for money? Has Artikhodjayev openly 
recused himself from all decisions 
that might benefit companies owned 
by himself, or immediate business 
partners?  What is the extent of the 
tax and customs exemptions granted 
to corporate entities associated with 
Artikhodjaev? Have associated entities 
directly or indirectly been provided 
with public finance? If so, under what 
conditions and terms? Has land or 
other state assets been granted on a 
zero cost basis to entities associated 
with Jahonghir Artikhodjayev? Were 
conflicts of interest openly declared and 
deliberated on before the provision of 
state aid to these associated entities? 
Was state aid delivered in an open, 
transparent manner on the basis of 
a clear selection criteria, applied at 
arm’s length? Will companies owned by 
Artikhodjayev or his business partners 
benefit from the US$400 million invested 
by Hyper Partners GmbH?   
In response to queries submitted by the 
author, the Mayor’s office states that 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev does not have a 
private interest in Tashkent City, and has 
no business relationship with Discover 
Invest LLC.43  Because the Mayor’s 
Office claims there was no conflict of 
interest, no information was provided 
on whether conflicts were declared, or 
whether mitigating steps were taken. It 
is impossible to determine what impact 
this conflict of interest may have had on 
Tashkent City, given that requests for 
planning and procurement information 
were denied.  
It should not be overlooked either, that 
Tashkent City has been associated 
with evictions and displacement of 
city residents, potentially in violation 
of international human rights norms. 
Atkhan Akhmedov writes: ‘In December 
2017, construction works on the new 
project led to the mass eviction of 
residents of the Ukcha-Almazar mahalla 
of Tashkent, who were literally thrown 
out onto the street ...’.44  Similar accounts 
featured in a story by Marc Bennetts 
published in The Guardian.45  This 
points to why conflicts of interest in 
public life require strong regulation. It 
is difficult to conceive how the Mayor 
is in a position to impartially hear the 
concerns of Tashkent citizens over a 
contentious urban development, if he, 
or a closely linked business partner, 
has a significant, direct interest in 
the venture. And even if Jahonghir 
Artikhodjayev possesses an exceptional 
personal constitution that might permit 
impartiality in these difficult situations, 
the optics nonetheless would be such as 
to erode public confidence in the 
Mayor’s office. 
Tashkent City, though, is not the only 
major urban project underway in Tashkent 
where these difficult questions arise.
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47 ‘On Measures to Create a Modern and High-Tech Recreation Park in the City of Tashkent’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Regulation, No.694, 4 
September 2017, available online: http://www.lex.uz/docs/3332461 (accessed 14 March 2019) 
48 Ibid.
THE NAVOI NATIONAL 
PARK REDEVELOPMENT 
The redevelopment of the Navoi 
National Park is a second major project 
in Uzbekistan’s capital over which 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev has Mayoral 
responsibility. Named after Alisher 
Navoi, a celebrated Uzbek intellectual 
and artist, the park is a popular open 
space in Tashkent. During 2015 it was 
named the first Eco Park in Central 
Asia by the UN country office in 
Uzbekistan.46
The proposed US$60 million venture 
will convert the national park into a 
‘high-tech recreation’ facility.47  It will 
include an amphitheatre, a shopping and 
entertainment centre, an amusement 
park, and dolphinarium. Developers have 
been granted a lease over the 20.79 
hectare properly for a period of 49 years. 
The Cabinet of Ministers regulation 
governing this arrangement does not 
disclose if any payment was made to 
secure the state lease.48  The Mayor’s 
office confirmed no purchase price was 
paid for the lease, but annual rental will 
be charged. 
Image 6: Construction activity at the Navoi National Park
There is no mention of an open, public 
tender in the regulation either. The 
Cabinet of Ministers regulation does, 
however, set out the state aid being 
provided to the recreation park’s 
developer. It includes custom duty 
exemptions, and fee exemptions when 
bringing in foreign specialists. The 
decree also allows the developer to 
initiate construction work in parallel 
with the development of design and 
estimate documentation until 1 January 
2020, a highly unusual scenario where 
a project appears to be starting before 
essential planning documentation 
has been approved. The Deputy Prime 
Minister, Minister of Culture, and Mayor 
of Tashkent, are charged with oversight 
responsibility.
IV.
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49 Bartlett, P. ‘Uzbekistan: Tashkent revamp tests official pledge on public dialogue’, Eurasianet, 4 October 2017, available online: https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-
tashkent-revamp-tests-official-pledge-on-public-dialogue (accessed 29 April 2019)
50 Stargate Systems LLC, Company Extract, 21432, accessed 14 March 2019 
51 Ibid.
52 Preston Impex LLP, Certificate of Registration of a Limited Partnership, Companies House, 25 January 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/SL029993 (accessed 14 March 2019)
53 Preston Impex LLP, Notification of Person with Significant Control, Companies House, 7 January 2019, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/SL029993 (accessed 14 March 2019)
54 See https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/SL033434
55 Letter from E Iminov, Head of Administration Tashkent Mayor’s Office, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.
The investor selected to undertake this 
state supported urban redevelopment 
is Stargate Systems, a company closely 
tied to the Akfa group. According to 
Akfa’s then financial director, Kamola 
Miraaliyeva, who spoke on behalf of 
the investor during 2017, no public 
tender for the project took place. She 
observes: ‘We took our concept to the 
city administration and the culture 
department, outlining the amount of 
investments, all the stages. The project 
was studied and approved’.49
According to Uzbekistan’s official 
business register, Stargate Systems was 
registered on 7 August 2017, less than a 
month before the Cabinet regulation was 
passed awarding the company rights to 
the Navoi Park redevelopment.50
Its shares are held by Jahongir  
Artikhodjayev (49.38%), Abror Ganiyev 
(14.94%), and Preston Impex LP 
(35.68%).51  In other words, the Mayor of 
Tashkent, currently has responsibility for 
overseeing a major urban redevelopment 
in which he has a significant private 
interest, alongside a close business 
partner from the Akfa-Artel group whose 
firm Discover Invest LLC has won a series 
of general contracts at Tashkent City. 
Like with Tashkent City, we also observe 
investment being channelled through a 
highly opaque offshore legal form, the 
Scottish Limited Partnership (SLP). All 
we do know from the limited reporting 
requirements placed on SLPs is that 
Preston Impex’s starting capital was 
£100.52  
It has declared an entity with significant 
control.53  In this instance the entity 
with significant control over Preston 
Impex is another SLP, Preston Impex 
Holdings LP, registered on 11 December 
2018. It has declared no person or 
entity with significant control.54  Its 
registered partners are nominee entities 
incorporated in the Seychelles.  
We, therefore, encounter a situation with 
the redevelopment of Navoi National 
Park where conflicts of interest, state 
aid, opaque corporate structures, 
and a lack of open competition fuse 
in a problematic mix. Once Jahongir 
Artikhodjayev became Mayor in April 
2018, it was incumbent on him to declare 
his private interest in Stargate Systems, 
given that one of his responsibilities as 
Mayor was to oversee the Navoi National 
Park redevelopment.  
The Mayor’s office rejects the assertion 
that Artikhodjayev has a ‘private interest’ 
in the Navoi Park Redevelopment.55  The 
public record suggests otherwise.
So far the focus has centred on 
construction and urban redevelopment. 
The dynamics mapped here can also be 
witnessed in the private health sector.
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Since assuming the Presidency in 2016, 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev has advocated 
for policy, legal and institutional 
arrangements that will, in his view, 
maximize freedom for entrepreneurs. 
One sector, in particular, has received 
special focus – health care. The 
Mirziyoyev government has passed a 
raft of decrees and regulations that 
aim to rapidly expand the private 
provision of health care services.56 
This policy agenda is being pump-
primed through considerable state aid, 
including generous tax and customs 
holidays, zero-cost awards of public 
infrastructure and land, the initiation of 
a state sponsored fund for investment 
in the private health care sector, and 
recommendations that banks advance 
preferential loans to private health care 
providers.57  One private health care 
provider, Akfa Medline, has been granted 
a range of privileges by the Mirziyoyev 
government.58 The Tashkent city 
administration has been charged with 
overseeing part of the state aid being 
channelled to Akfa Medline.59
According to business registry records 
Akfa Medline is majority owned by 
“Artikhodjayeva Nigoraxon Baxromxo‘ja” 
(61.60%). She is the wife of the current 
Mayor of Tashkent. A minority stake is 
held in Akfa Medline by “Mirzaliyeva 
Kamolat Kukanbayevna” (38.40%). 
Mirzaliyeva is an Akfa executive who 
has also been involved in managing the 
Navoi National Park redevelopment.60 
As its corporate name denotes, Medline 
is part of the Akfa group. Its website is 
registered to the J-United Group, one of 
the main holding entities employed by 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev.61 
The special treatment meted out by 
the Mirziyoyev government to Akfa 
Medline has a number of elements. For 
example, a December 2018 Presidential 
Decree, appoints Akfa Medline’s 
Director and minority shareholder, 
Kamolat Mirzaliyeva, to a Working 
Commission which has been set up to 
draft regulations and formulate practical 
measures for advancing the national 
healthcare strategy 2019-2025.62  Akfa 
Medline is the only private sector 
actor permitted representation on the 
Commission. It sits alongside Ministers 
and senior civil servants. The company, 
therefore, is in an unparalleled position 
within the sector to influence public 
investment and state regulations that 
will potentially pump-prime, subsidise 
and grow the private consumption of 
health care services. 
When Akfa Medline was asked about 
the selection process that led to this 
appointment, the company observed: 
‘The [Presidential] decree gives special 
attention to medical practices using 
the innovative potential of specialized 
centers and the development of 
e-health. Akfa Medline is the largest 
multi-functional modern medical clinic 
that meets these requirements’.63 
The inference appears to be that 
Akfa Medline’s selection was on the 
basis of its unique expertise in the 
area. However in the absence of any 
public documentation, or a response 
from the Ministry of Health to written 
inquiries made by the author, it is 
impossible to verify this decision was 
made transparently, using an objective 
process, that did not give unfair 
advantage to a particular market actor.
While the above privilege appears 
to have gone largely unnoticed, a 
subsequent Cabinet of Ministers 
regulation dated 15 February 2019, has 
triggered more audible public concern. 
The regulations establish a new private 
higher education institution, Akfa 
University, which will specialise in the 
medical sciences. The private university 
is a joint venture between Akfa Medline 
and Gachon University in South Korea. 
The regulations promise significant state 
aid to this for-profit venture. This state 
aid includes, granting at zero cost the 
Shaykhantakhur Medical College for use 
by Akfa University – current students 
will be forced to conclude their studies at 
Tashkent Economic College. Additionally, 
the private university will be exempted 
from custom duties and from paying all 
types of taxes. 
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
AND UNFAIR ADVANTAGE? THE CASE OF AKFA MEDLINE 
56 ‘On Comprehensive Measures to Fundamentally Improve the Health Care System of the Republic of Uzbekistan’, Decree - President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
No.PP-5590, 7 December 2018, available online: www.lex.uz/docs/4096199 (accessed 14 March 2019)
57  ‘On the Creation of Additional Conditions for the Further Development of Private Medical Organizations’, Regulation - President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
No.PP-3450, 29 December 2017, available online: www.lex.uz/docs/3480499 (accessed 14 March 2019)
58 Ibid.
59  ‘On the Formation of Akfa University’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan - Regulation, No.130, 15 February 2019, available online: www.lex.uz/
docs/4202158 (accessed 14 March 2019)
60 Akfa Medline LLC, Company Extract, Registration No. 520218, accessed 14 March 2019
61 Verified via https://www.whois.net/
62 ‘On Comprehensive Measures to Fundamentally Improve the Health Care System of the Republic of Uzbekistan’, Decree - President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
No.PP-5590, 7 December 2018, available online: www.lex.uz/docs/4096199 (accessed 14 March 2019)
63 Email from N Abdusalimova, Akfa Medline, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.
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The regulations also instruct the 
Tashkent city administration to 
support and monitor the project: ‘To 
the hokimiyat of the city of Tashkent 
to assist the University in preparing 
the necessary design and estimate 
documentation for the reconstruction 
and overhaul of the University’s 
buildings and facilities, building a 
dormitory for teachers and students, 
equipping it with the necessary teaching 
and laboratory equipment, medical 
training machines, computer equipment 
and library stock, with university to 
begin operating before the beginning of 
the 2019/2020 academic year’.64  
Mapping the state aid provided to 
Akfa Medline, against the national 
law on anti-corruption, prompts a 
number of key questions. Has the state 
aid channelled to Akfa Medline been 
provided in an open and competitive 
fashion at arm’s length, using a clear 
and objective selection criteria? Have 
all conflicts of interest been declared 
and transparently managed? Was the 
appointment of Kamolat Mirzaliyeva 
to the Working Commission conducted 
in an open and competitive manner, 
employing objective criteria?
Echoing Stargate Systems and the 
Navoi National Park redevelopment, 
Akfa Medline claims it formulated the 
Akfa University concept, and then won 
government support: ‘Based on the 
results of the study of consumer demand 
and the high demand for highly qualified 
medical personnel, Akfa Medline 
launched an initiative to create a modern 
University. The Ministry of Health 
supported this initiative’.65  
Attempts to obtain access to documents 
setting out the business case made 
to the Ministry of Health were 
unsuccessful. Akfa Medline argues the 
business case is ‘confidential’.66  The 
Ministry of Health did not respond to a 
request for information. However, the 
Tashkent Mayor’s office argued that the 
decision to support the university, with 
state aid, was made ‘objectively’.67 
A lack of publicly available information 
on the business case and processes 
underpinning the government’s decision 
to support the project with state aid, 
prohibits any attempt to verify that the 
decision was made on an objective basis, 
according to a transparent and rigorous 
criteria, applied through an open 
evaluation process. 
Akfa Medline acknowledges the Mayor’s 
wife is a majority shareholder. It rejects 
the assertion that this presents a 
conflict of interest for the Mayor. The 
Mayor’s administration agrees, arguing 
that responsibility for implementing 
the Cabinet of Ministers regulation 
establishing Akfa University lies with 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
for Health. Article 10 of the regulations, 
cited above, clearly apportions some 
responsibility for the project to the 
Tashkent city administration.   
Like with the other Akfa linked projects 
analysed above, Akfa University impacts 
on the rights and interests of public 
stakeholders, including the academic 
community generally, and the staff and 
students at Shaykhantakhur Medical 
College in particular. Akfa Medline was 
asked if the wider academic community 
was consulted, they responded: ‘The 
creation of the Akfa University in the 
city of Tashkent was supported by the 
Ministry of Health, under which the draft 
government decision on the creation of 
the University of Akfa was coordinated 
with all ministries and departments 
based on the regulations for the 
development and adoption of legislation 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan’.68
Akfa Medline was also asked about 
any consultation conducted with 
Shaykhantakhur Medical College 
staff and students. They responded: 
‘According to the Ministry of Health, 
the Shaykhantakhur Medical College 
was planned to be closed as part of 
the transition to 11-year schooling and 
a reduction in the number of colleges 
and academic lyceums. The Ministry 
of Higher Education has agreed that 
students at Shaykhantakhur Medical 
College will be transferred to the 
building of the Tashkent Economic 
College until the completion of the 
educational process. The teaching staff 
of the Shaykhantakhur Medical College 
will be employed in other educational 
institutions, which will strengthen the 
teaching staff of these institutions’.69
Set against this precarious context of 
state aid, conflicts of interest, a lack of 
transparency and closed procurement/
selection practices, the final noteworthy 
feature of the Akfa-Artel case, is the 
group’s use of opaque offshore entities.
64 ‘On the Formation of Akfa University’, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan - Regulation, No.130, 15 February 2019, available online: www.lex.uz/
docs/4202158 (accessed 14 March 2019)
65 Email from N Abdusalimova, Akfa Medline, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.
66 Ibid.
67 Letter from E Iminov, Head of Administration Tashkent Mayor’s Office, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019.
68 Email from N Abdusalimova, Akfa Medline, to K Lasslett, Professor of Criminology, Ulster University, 25 April 2019
65 Ibid.
Image 7: Work begins at Shaykhantakhur 
Medical College in preparation for Akfa 
University.
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A DANGEROUS DALLIANCE WITH THE OFFSHORE WORLD
The use of opaque offshore entities 
registered in jurisdictions with weak 
compliance records, is not in itself 
evidence of wrongdoing or criminality. 
It does, however, raise red flags that 
merit heightened levels of scrutiny, 
especially given the documented 
role such entities have played in 
facilitating bribery, money laundering 
and fraud in Central Asia. 
Companies within the Akfa-Artel group 
were found, during this investigation, to 
be owned by offshore entities that were 
opaque and staffed by nominees linked 
to major money-laundering scandals 
and aggravated fraud. In addition to this, 
on at least two occasions an offshore 
holding entity used an illegal ploy to 
conceal the identity of persons/entities 
with significant control.
Table 4: Offshore entities tied to the Akfa-Artel group
Name Type Date of 
Registration
Address Current Members Person with 
Significant 
Control
Bergman Ltd Limited Liability 
Company, 
England
16/10/2007 13 John Prince's Street, 2nd 
Floor, London, England, 
W1G 0JR
Directors:  Trendmax Inc, 










06/03/2013 Room 12 Alva Business 
Centre, 11 Alva Street, 
Edinburgh, Scotland, EH2 
4PH
General Partner: Aurora 
Marketing Limited. Limited 









15/09/2009 Suite B, 11 Churchill Court, 
58 Station Road, North 
Harrow, Middlesex, HA2 
7SA
Designated Member: Neocorp 
Experts LP, Bondwest AG , 








13/04/2016 Office 8 44-46 Morningside 
Road, Edinburgh, United 
Kingdom, EH10 4BF
General Partner: Lajos Balog. 










06/10/2017 85 Great Portland Street, 
London, United Kingdom, 
W1W 7LT
General Partner: Fiorteks 










25/10/2018 64a Cumberland Street, 
Edinburgh, EH3 6RE
General Partner: Fiorteks 
Impex Limited, Sturari Impex 
Limited. Limited Partner: 










27/01/2017 101 Rose Street South Lane, 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 
EH2 3JG
General Partner: Silvano 




Holdings Lp  
(5/11/2018)
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Name Type Date of 
Registration









23/10/2012 25 2f1, Crighton Place, 
Edinburgh, EH7 4NY
General Partner: Kingsley 
Business Services Ltd. Limited 










28/02/2013 43 Duke Street, Edinburgh, 
United Kingdom, EH6 8HH
General Partner: Maxfino 












29/11/2016 Suite 7 209 City Road, 
Cardiff, CF24 3JD
General Partner: Altimex Ltd. 
Limited Partner: Crestberg 
Ltd
N/A




788/790 Finchley Road, 
London, England, NW11 7TJ"
Designated Member: Exponet 










11/12/2018 64a Cumberland Street, 
Edinburgh, EH3 6RE
General Partners: Fiorteks 
Impex Limited, Sturari Impex 
Limited Limited Parnters: 









25/01/2017 1 Lochrin Square, 92-98 
Fountainbridge, Edinburgh, 
United Kingdom, EH3 9QA
General Partner: Konstantins 










24/11/2014 175 Darkes Lane 2nd 
Floor, Suite B, Potters Bar, 
Hertfordshire, England, EN6 
1BW
Designated Member: 










06/08/2008 48 Queen Anne Street, 
London, W1G 9JJ
Directors: Fynel Limited, 









19/06/2014 Olympia Industrial Estate 
Coburg Road, Unit 5, 
London, England, N22 6TZ
Designated Member: Hillmont 












09/03/2012 634A Enja Road, 13-223, 
Senja Gateway, Singapore 
Directors: Seet Mei Siah, 
Wong Yueh Yan.
Shareholder: 








11/06/2012 275C Compassvale Link, 13-
216, Aspella, Singapore 
Directors: Ng Lee Siew, 
Borovik Rimma.
Shareholder: 
Ng Lee Siew 
(13/03/2017)
28 Breaking with the Past
To evidence these claims, a useful 
starting point is Dartlex Impex LLP, an 
English Limited Liability Partnership,70  
and Worldpoint Sales Limited, an English 
Limited Liability Company. Media reports 
from 2015 identify Dartlex Impex LLP 
as the British partner of J-United Group 
– one of Jahonghir Artikhodjayev’s 
principal holding entities – in a US$35.2 
million joint-venture focusing on the 
production of aluminium products 
within the Navoi Free Economic Zone.71  
The Navoi Free Economic Zone grants 
investors significant tax and customs 
exemptions. 
In addition to being a foreign partner 
Dartlex Impex LLP is also a direct 
investor in the Akfa-Artel Group. 
For instance, Dartlex Impex LLP has 
held a 95.7% stake in White Machine 
Technology, which is an Artel brand 
company involved in the production of 
vacuum cleaners and microwave ovens.72 
In the case of Worldpoint Sales Limited, 
up until recently it has held 100% of the 
shares in Eko Elektron (the shares have 
been transferred to Ismail Israilov).73  Eko 
Elektron is an important local company 
used by the Artel brand in Uzbekistan for 
its electronics and white good interests. 
Basic due diligence inquiry into both 
offshore entities raise numerous 
concerns. Dartlex Impex LLP was 
established on 15 September 2009.74  
Its formation agent was Ireland & 
Overseas Acquisitions Ltd. According 
to the Organised Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project (OCCRP), Ireland 
& Overseas Acquisitions has ‘played 
a role in frauds in the arms trade, 
pharmaceuticals and other businesses’.75  
Examination of Dartlex Impex’s filings 
lodged with the UK’s Companies House, 
reveal that Juri Vitman, Stan Gorin and 
Ali Moulaye have been directly involved 
in the firm’s administration.76  They sit 
alongside current and previous members 
of Dartlex Impex LLP, which are nominee 
companies registered in the Marshall 
Islands, Cyprus, Seychelles, and Belize, 
jurisdictions known for corporate and 
financial secrecy.77 
Worldpoint Sales Limited was 
incorporated a year before Dartlex 
Impex, on 6 August 2008. But they 
share a number of common links.78  For 
example, Juri Vitman sat on Worldpoint 
Sales’ Board of Directors. Worldpoint 
Sales current Directors includes 
Fynel Limited, and Juchun Lee, while 
Unitwell Technology Ltd is the Company 
Secretary. Unitwell is also a current 
designated member of Dartlex Impex 
LLP. A past Director of Worldpoint Sales, 
worth mentioning, is Danny Banger. 
More on him shortly. 
Juri Vitman is one common denominator 
linking both registered UK legal entities. 
He has been implicated in a range of 
corruption scandals. According to OCCRP:
Vitman is an ex-employee of the 
Latvia-based Parex Bank and, 
together with two infamous fronts 
for corrupt companies named Erik 
Vanagels and Stan Gorin [also 
linked to Dartlex Impex LLP], acted 
as a proxy in the “Proxy Platform,” 
a massive money-laundering 
operation identified by OCCRP in 
2011. The Proxy Platform was a set of 
offshore companies which provided 
money-laundering services for 
criminals all over the world including 
Mexican drug cartels, Asian Triads, 
Russian and Moldovan organized 
crime and state companies and 
officials in Russia and Ukraine during 
the reign of Viktor Yanukovych. Some 
of the money stolen from the Russian 
treasury in the Sergey Magnitsky 
case used the Proxy Platform.79 
70 Transparency International UK have flagged LLPs as high risk entities, see Hiding in Plain Sight: How UK Companies are Used to Launder Corrupt Wealth, 
Transparency International UK, available online: www.transparency.org.uk/publications/hiding-in-plain-sight/ (accessed 15 April 2019)
71  ‘New Uzbek-British joint venture created at FIEZ Navoi’, Uz Daily, 5 July 2015, available online: www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/32782 (accessed 14 March 2019)
72 White Machine Technology LLC, Historical Company Extract, Registration No. 1178, accessed 14 March 2019
73 Eko Elektron LLC, Historical Company Extract, Registration No. 5079-11, accessed 14 March 2019
74 Partnership information is available through its online Companies House file, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC348606
75 Radu, P. ‘Russia: The cellist and the lawyer’, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 26 April 2016, available online: https://www.occrp.org/en/
panamapapers/russia-the-cellist-and-the-lawyer (accessed 20 May 2019)
76 Investigative journalists Oliver Bullough and Jane Bradley link Moulaye to a network of 127 companies implicated in ‘large-scale tax evasion, fraud, or corruption’. 
When they tracked him down it was revealed that Moulaye is now a suburban dentist in Brussels. Moulaye told the reporters ‘I have no clue what these companies 
are, where they are based, and what’s their business’. See: Bradley, J. and Bullough, O. ‘The ghost companies connected to suspected money laundering, corruption, 
and Paul Manafort’, BuzzFeed, 23 August 2018, available online: https://www.buzzfeed.com/janebradley/shell-companies-money-laundering-uk-paul-manafort 
(accessed 15 May 2019)
77 The most recent accounts are signed by Dong-Hee Kang for Bondwest AG, both are discussed by industry expert Graham Barrow: Barrow, G. ‘Goodbye Ali Moulaye, 
hello Kang Dong-Hee!’, no date, available online: https://grahambarrow.com/goodbye-ali-moulaye-hello-kang-dong-hee/ (accessed 15 April 2019)
78 Corporate information is available through its online Companies House file https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06665418
79 Sukhotin, A. and Anin, A. ‘Russian football under scrutiny on coaches contract’, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 4 May 2015, available online: 
https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/3915-russian-football-under-scrutiny-on-coaches-contract (accessed 14 March 2019)
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Then there is the former Worldpoint 
Sales Director, Danny Banger. The UNDP 
has blacklisted Banger until 2023 for 
his role in a ‘fraud with aggravating 
circumstances’ which took place in 
Uzbekistan.80  
Many of these individuals and companies 
linked both to Dartlex Impex LLP and 
Worldpoint Sales Limited, appear to be 
nominee office holders, who provide 
their services to dozens of entities.81  In 
practice, they often know little about the 
company they are signing accounts for, 
and other documents. However, owing 
to regulatory weaknesses in the UK it is 
impossible to reach past this nominee 
layer and examine the real network of 
individuals administering these offshore 
vehicles.  
In the case of Dartlex Impex LLP, it uses 
an illegal manoeuvre to conceal from 
the public persons with significant 
control. Under 2015 reforms to the 
UK’s Companies Act 2006 Part 21A, 
registrable legal entities must take 
active steps to disclose on a public 
register persons with significant control 
(PSC). A PSC may be an individual, or a 
‘relevant legal entity’. The latter category 
captures entities subject to legal 
regimes that also require transparency 
with respect to PSCs. This in effect 
means the public, by following the 
chain of control, can find the ultimate 
individual or individuals with significant 
control over a registered UK legal entity. 
In the case of Dartlex Impex LLP, its 
designated PSC is a Welsh Limited 
Partnership, Neocorp Experts LP.82  It 
is not a ‘relevant legal entity’. Welsh 
Limited Partnerships are currently under 
no legal obligation to declare PSCs. Any 
attempt to discover the ultimate PSC of 
Dartlex Impex LLP, in effect, has been 
prevented through this ploy. 
This was not the only example of this 
apparently illegal ploy being used by 
an offshore company tied to the group. 
In section III it was noted that the 
Uzbekistani joint stock company, Perfect 
Plast Profil, is a shareholder in Akfa 
Dream World a firm investing in Lot 5 
of Tashkent City. Perfect Plast Profil’s 
stock, in turn, is owned by the Esperansa 
Group LP, a Scottish Limited Partnership. 
Esperansa Group LP has declared one 
PSC,83  Esperansa Incorporated LP, an 
English Limited Partnership registered 
on 6 October 2017. 
In the instance of Worldpoint Sales 
Limited, it has declared one PSC, Wildlux 
Solutions LLP, an English Limited 
Liability Partnership.84  This is a ‘relevant 
legal entity’ under the Companies Act. 
However, Wildlux Solutions LLP made 
a PSC declaration on 12 February 2017, 
stating that ‘the company knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe that there 
is no registrable person or registrable 
relevant legal entity in relation to the 
company’.85  In other words Wildlux 
Solutions LLP is claiming there is no 
one involved in the business who fits 
within the legal definition of a PSC – 
which stipulates a PSC should own or 
control over 25% of the entity. The UK 
government makes no attempt to verify 
the accuracy of these statements.86  
In a 2018 report Global Witness 
observes: ‘One of the biggest 
weaknesses of the UK PSC register is the 
lack of systematic verification of data 
submitted – i.e. it is solely self-reported 
data from companies’.87  Global Witness 
add in a 2019 update: ‘It remains all 
too easy for someone to lie about their 
true ownership, by simply saying the 
company has no ultimate owner, listing 
a secretive offshore company as their 
ultimate owner, or by putting forward 
a fake person or nominee’.88  In effect a 
system of self-regulation is in operation. 
This is a high risk compliance strategy, 
given the historical evidence of abuse.
80  ‘UNDP entries to the UN ineligibility list’, United National Development Programme, no date, available online: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/
operations/procurement/business/protest-and-sanctions/ineligibility-list/ (accessed 14 March 2019)
81 Open Democracy Investigations ‘The strange connections of Tashkent City’s “British investor”’, Open Democracy, 21 February 2019, available online: https://www.
opendemocracy.net/en/odr/strange-connections-of-tashkent-city-s-british-investor/ (accessed 20 May 2019)
82 Dartlex Impex LLP, Notification of a Person with Significant Control, Companies House, 20 August 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/OC348606 (accessed 14 March 2019)
83 Esperansa Group LP, Notification of a Person with Significant Control, Companies House, 12 October 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/SL025982/persons-with-significant-control (accessed 19 May 2019)
84 Worldpoint Sales Limited, Notification of a Person with Significant Control, Companies House, 8 September 2017, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.
gov.uk/company/06665418(accessed 8 September 2017)
85 Wildlux Solutions LLP, Confirmation Statement, 23 February 2017, Companies House, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC398287 
(23 February 2017)
86 An excellence source of analysis on the enduring weaknesses in the UK’s corporate disclosure system is The Dark Money Files podcast: http://thedarkmoneyfiles.
com 
87 Global Witness The Companies We Keep: What the UK’s Open Data Register Actually Tells Us About Company Ownership, Global Witness, 2018, available online: 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/companies-we-keep (accessed 15 April 2019); 
see also Bradley, J. and Bullough, O. ‘The ghost companies connected to suspected money laundering, corruption, and Paul Manafort’, BuzzFeed, 23 August 2018, 
available online: https://www.buzzfeed.com/janebradley/shell-companies-money-laundering-uk-paul-manafort (accessed 15 April 2019)
88 Global Witness Getting the UK’s House in Order, Global Witness, May 2019, available online: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-
money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/getting-uks-house-order/ (accessed 20 May 2019)
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Indeed, once the PSC chain was followed 
for all 18 offshore entities registered in 
the UK linked to the Akfa-Artel group, 
100% resulted in an ultimate declaration 
that there was no person with significant 
control. This in itself is not illegal. 
However, it is irregular. Global Witness 
found that less than 10% of entities 
which must comply with the PSC regime, 
declared no PSC.89 100% stands in 
notable contrast to this.
The problem of accuracy and 
transparency extends to annual financial 
reporting. Worldpoint Sales and Dartlex 
Impex, have both reported owning 
minimal assets, and earning negligible 
profits. Yet both firms have been the 
beneficial owners of key corporate 
vehicles in the highly successful Akfa-
Artel group. While Dartlex Impex, for 
instance, was part of a US$35.2 million 
joint-venture. 
These are not isolated examples. 
Another registered UK legal entity 
examined during this investigation 
is Wynex Innovation LLP, an English 
Limited Liability Partnership registered 
on 19 June 2014. During 2015 Wynex 
Innovation was reported to be 
spearheading a joint venture that would 
manufacture mobile phones through a 
US$2 million investment with Infinity 
Electronics, a local company producing 
consumer electronics under the Artel 
Brand.90  At the time it had no declared 
assets, and an operating net loss of 
£419.91  
Wynex Innovation LLP appears more 
recently as a foreign investor in Tashkent 
City lot 1, through its 100% shareholding 
in Techno Continental. Techno 
Continental is a joint stock company 
which was registered in Uzbekistan on 
27 January 2018. It has an 8.17% stake 
in High Land City LLC, which is the sole 
stated investor in Tashkent City lot 1 (see 
section III). In its latest annual accounts 
for 2018 Wynex Innovation declares that 
its principal activity is ‘cargo forwarding 
agent as well as trade of household 
appliances and received commission’.92  
It reportedly has no income, and an 
operating loss of £1,500. The LLP states 
it has £300 in cash. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
determine whether such accounts 
submitted to Companies House contain 
substantial inaccuracies. There is 
no verification procedures currently 
operating in the UK.
In the case of UK Limited Liability 
Partnerships there is, at the very least, 
enough financial disclosure for vigilant 
members of the public to identify and 
report irregularities. However, with 
respect to Limited Partnerships, there is 
generally no such requirement. 
Take the example of MacMerry 
Management LP. It has an extensive 
Uzbekistani stock portfolio including 
a 78.73% interest in Technic Globe, 
and 50% stakes in Quality Electronics, 
Factory of Technologies, Asia Electron 
and Next Generation Products which 
are investors in Tashkent City (see 
section III). Despite operating from UK 
shores, the British public cannot access 
financial information on this Scottish 
Limited Partnership linked to a group 
in Uzbekistan which is making major 
investments in an area under the direct 
public responsibility of the group’s 
founder. For MacMerry Management 
LP, we only know it has £50 in starting 
capital contributed by its Seychelles 
based partner Longford Solutions Ltd.93  
The offshore reach of Akfa-Artel also 
goes beyond the UK. Notably, the 
Singaporean registered firms, Commerce 
Standard Pte Ltd, and Singapore 
Syndicate Group International Pte Ltd, 
both own Uzbekistani companies in the 
Akfa-Artel group structure. It was also 
noted in section III, Commerce Standard 
is an investor in lot 7 of Tashkent City, 
while Singapore Syndicate Group is an 
investor in lot 7 and lot 1.
There is no requirement in Singapore 
that companies publicly disclose 
persons with significant control. It is, 
therefore, impossible to verify who 
stands behind either firm. 
However, from the small digital imprints 
available in Uzbekistan it is apparent 
that Commerce Standard, is issuing high 
interest loans (14%), for the term of one 
year, from an Uzbekistani subsidiary 
to another company in the Akfa-Artel 
group, owned by Singapore Syndicate 
Group International.94  In another 
digital imprint, a Commerce Standard 
89 Global Witness The Companies We Keep: What the UK’s Open Data Register Actually Tells Us About Company Ownership, Global Witness, 2018, available online: 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/companies-we-keep (accessed 15 April 2019)
90 ‘A new joint venture for the production of mobile phones created in FIEZ “Navoi”’, Gazeta, 4 July 2015, available online: https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2015/07/04/
phones/ (accessed 15 March 2019)
91  Wynex Innovation LLP, Accounts, 22 March 2016, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC393843/ (accessed 15 March 2019)
92 Wynex Innovation LLP, Accounts, 24 October 2018, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/OC393843/ (accessed 19 May 2019)
93 MacMerry Management LP, Application for Registration of a Limited Partnership, 23 October 2012, available online: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/
SL011585/filing-history(accessed 19 May 2019)
94 ‘Decision - Software Partner Foreign Enterprise in the Form of Joint-Stock Company “Quality Electronics”’, 2 May 2018, No. 11/2018.
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subsidiary received a loan from Kapital 
Bank in the amount of US$5 million, at a 
more modest 8% rate of interest. Real 
property belonging to Nukus Remmash 
LLC, Technic Globe LLC and Art Sunrise 
LLC was put up by Commerce Standard 
as security. Nukus Remmash is owned 
by Technic Globe, Technic Globe in 
turn is majority owned by MacMerry 
Management LP, while Art Sunrise LLC 
is owned by the Mayor of Tashkent, 
Jahongir Artikhodjayev.95 
With the exception of Dartlex Impex 
LLP and Esperansa Group LP’s PSC 
declarations, none of the activities and 
practices presented here are necessarily 
unlawful in nature, or directly denote 
corruption – although annual accounts 
submitted by Worldpoint Sales, Dartlex 
Impex, and Wynex Innovation LLP, 
exhibit limited signs of commercial 
activity, despite considerable business 
interests in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, 
when opaque structures are used to hold 
shares within a group that is in receipt 
of significant state aid and is linked to 
a senior public official, it raises serious 
governance concerns. 
95 ‘Decision Software Partner Foreign Enterprise in the Form of Joint-Stock Company “Quality Electronics”’, 19 June 2018, No 14/2018.
Image 8: Annual accounts for Dartlex Impex LLP 
signed by Juri Vitman.
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The Mirziyoyev government, with 
international support, has initiated 
a rapid programme of privatisation, 
deregulation, and public investment, 
that includes the provision of 
substantial state aid to business. This 
investigation into the commercial 
interests of rising political power-
broker, Jahongir Artikhodjayev, and the 
group he founded, signals the serious 
risks this strategy courts when 
implemented through administrative 
and transnational market structures 
that are opaque, and weakly regulated. 
It has established in this report that a 
major business group, linked to a senior 
government office holder, is in receipt 
of significant state aid across a range 
of sectors, including zero cost awards 
of public assets. In several notable 
instances public responsibility for 
oversight of this aid has been placed 
in the hands of the group’s founder, 
the Mayor of Tashkent. It appears that 
conflicts of interest were not reported to 
a superior or managed through special 
procedures. Complicating matters 
further, the transnational ownership 
and financial structures making up the 
Akfa-Artel group are opaque and exhibit 
numerous red flags. 
During the final draft of this report, 
it was observed that Jahongir 
Artikhodjayev’s shares in the Akfa-Artel 
group are beginning to be transferred 
into the name of his wife, managers and 
existing stockholders within the group, 
including Kamolot Mirzaliyeva and Abror 
Ganiyev.96 Given that conflicts of interest 
regulations include business partners 
and family members, these share 
transfers would not necessarily exempt 
the Mayor from declaring a conflict 
of interest, were these companies to 
become involved in transactions falling 
within his public portfolio. Additionally, 
because Uzbekistan does not operate a 
public (or any) beneficial owners register, 
unless the Mayor chooses to voluntary 
disclose information, we have no way 
of knowing if he retains a beneficial 
interest in these affected companies 
through a trust agreement with the 
legal stockholders. 
The red flags noted in this report 
are compounded by the opaque 
and inconsistent methods used in 
Uzbekistan’s public administration. For 
instance, there is an absence of open 
and transparent information, that is 
accessible, which details the objective 
criteria, arms-length process, and open 
mechanisms used to award contracts, 
and state aid, as required under the 
national anti-corruption law. Public 
procurement requirements set out 
in anti-corruption and procurement 
laws, are being circumvented through 
the official granting of exceptions. 
Exacerbating matters, despite a stated 
commitment to freedom of information, 
in practice the government of Uzbekistan 
is hesitant to release information 
pertaining to decision making processes 
that are of critical public significance. 
There is also a failure to consult with 
the public before taking decisions that 
impact on key rights and interests. 
It is apparent that the current broad 
requirements pertaining to conflicts 
of interest need to be operationalised 
through laws, regulations, policies, and 
procedure, that provide a clearer set of 
standards and processes for declaring, 
and managing conflicts of interest, and 
sanctioning those officials which breach 
requirements. Finally Uzbekistan’s 
system of corporate disclosure and 
transparency, is limited, and there 
is a lack of an observable reform 
agenda. There is also a concerning 
lack of transparency and scrutiny of 
the financing behind large projects 
sponsored, in part, by government. When 
beneficial ownership and the origin 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
96 Akfa Engineer and Management LLC, Company Extract, 20708, accessed on 19 May 2019; Jako Industrial Group, Company Extract, 872, accessed on 19 May 2019.
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of capital is hidden, it creates a fertile 
opportunity structure for a range of 
illicit practices.  
There is, however, a welcomed 
preparedness on the part of select public 
and private actors to engage with civil 
society, and the media, on challenging 
topics. The Mayor of Tashkent, in 
particular, has demonstrated a clear 
willingness to engage with criticism, 
and has welcomed public and private 
dialogue. This reflects a wider 
preparedness within the Mirziyoyev 
government to consider some of the 
more sensitive human rights and public 
integrity issues that have hindered 
Uzbekistan over the past two decades. 
Despite the serious limitations observed 
above, this change in culture, potentially 
provides a basis on which substantive 
new reforms can be designed, discussed 
and implemented. 
 
In response to the findings 
presented in this report a number 
of recommendations are made, 
which complement and reinforce 
recommendations recently made by the 
OECD, Global Witness and Uzbekistani 
civil society.97  Critically, Uzbekistan’s 
anti-corruption laws need to be 
consolidated through applied measures, 
that are designed to ensure there is full 
transparency, open competition, and 
regulatory compliance, within the public 
and private sector. This can be achieved, 
in part, by drawing on examples of 
good practice from other jurisdictions, 
including full and open online registers 
for corporate disclosure, public tenders, 
and the financial interests of senior 
public officer holders, strengthened 
through investment in compliance, 
prosecution and public reporting. 
Responsibility also falls on jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom and 
Singapore, that supply opaque offshore 
holding structures, to invest in more 
rigorous compliance cultures, including 
through the prosecution of those entities 
which violate regulations, alongside 
legal reform designed to tackle 
loopholes that frustrate transparency 
and integrity. Finally, in addition to the 
above Uzbekistan should implement 
practical legal and administrative 
measures for managing conflicts of 
interest, and sanctioning those who fail 
to comply with the law, with rigorous 
public data kept on compliance.
97 Global Witness (2018) The Companies We Keep: What the UK’s Open Data Register Actually Tells Us About Company Ownership, available online: https://www.
globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/companies-we-keep(accessed 15 April 2019); OECD (2019) 
Anti-corruption Reforms in Uzbekistan: 4th Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, available online: https://www.oecd.org/corruption/
acn/OECD-ACN-Uzbekistan-4th-Round_Monitoring-Report-2019-ENG.pdf (accessed 19 May 2019); ‘Uzbek activists’ proposal: Principles for responsible asset 
repatriation to Uzbekistan’, 9 August 2018, available online: https://corruptionandhumanrights.org/publications/uzbek-activists-proposal-principles-for-
responsible-asset-repatriation-to-uzbekistan/ (accessed 19 May 2019)
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OPEN AND COMPETITIVE TENDERS: 
All public procurement and the sale/
lease of state owned assets above a 
threshold, should be executed through 
a fair and open tender process, except 
in clearly circumscribed emergency 
situations.  
CEASE ANTI-COMPETITIVE AWARDS:
The government should cease all public-
private initiatives and the granting of 
state aid, that are agreed without a 
formal and open tender process. This 
practice does not assure value for money 
or ensure the best operator is selected 
to lead major projects. 
TRANSPARENT AND FAIR STATE AID:
State aid should be governed by a clear 
selection criteria and a transparent 
selection process, set out in regulations 
and documented publicly.
ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION: 
To enhance transparency, and 
accountability to the public, all tenders 
and government contracts should 
be published on a dedicated website, 
governed by clear rules of disclosure.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION:
Existing freedom of information laws 
should be rigorously enforced by 
the Government of Uzbekistan, with 
sanction for those public agencies that 
fail to comply with their legal obligation 
to provide information upon request 
within fifteen days. Having dedicated 
Freedom of Information officers within 
government departments may also 
help to expedite requests. A public 
register should be kept of Freedom of 
Information requests, the government’s 
response, and digital copies of the 
documents supplied.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE:
Registered entities in Uzbekistan should 
be governed by an open and rigorous 
system of corporate disclosure, where 
the public can freely access current 
and historical information on beneficial 
owners, persons with significant 
control, senior office holders, and annual 
accounts.
DUE DILIGENCE:
The state should attempt to incentivise 
best practice in the private sector, 
by only contracting with actors who 
meet certain transparency, fiscal, and 
professionalism benchmarks.  
RECOMMENDATIONS TO POLICY MAKERS IN UZBEKISTAN
Based off the evidence there is a need for progress on the following fronts:
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REGISTER OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS:
All senior office holders and elected 
members of government, should 
disclose annually in a public register  
of interests, their financial interests. 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
There should be dedicated legal 
provisions that provide a more precise 
set of governance mechanisms for 
declaring and handling conflicts of 
interest, and sanctioning those who 
violate anti-corruption rules on this 
front. Additionally, there needs to 
be rigorous data kept and published 
publicly on compliance.
PUBLIC CONSULTATION: 
In those instances where the rights 
and interests of particular individuals 
or groups will be impacted by public 
decisions it is critical that those affected 
are consulted, provided with detailed 
information, have their feedback 
incorporated into the decision making 
process, and have recourse to remedy. 
ENHANCED COMPLIANCE:
It is important that a culture of 
accountability and compliance is 
fostered through an independent system 
of audit and inspection, that is open 
and accessible to the public, to ensure 
government agencies and registered 
legal entities are in compliance with 
regulations/laws. 
FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH:
Journalists and activists in Uzbekistan 
are forced to practice self-censorship in 
order to avoid persecution. There should 
be protections in place that assure, 
without caveats, journalists, and civil 
society can report on good governance, 
corruption, market abuse, and human 
rights related issues, without fear 
of reprisals. 
VETTING OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
Concessions should only be granted to 
foreign investors, when clear proof is 
provided that the ultimate beneficial 
owners of these companies, and those 
providing the capital, are foreign citizens. 
Additionally, concessions should be 
granted on the basis that the investors 
meets certain minimum standards with 
respect to transparency and corporate 
governance.
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMPANIES 
ACT 2006:
Companies Act 2006 reforms demanding 
greater levels of disclosure, must be 
enforced proactively through risk based 
audits and the prosecution of those in 
serious breach of the law. The reforms 
proposed by Global Witness in its 2018 
report The Companies We Keep offer a 
powerful foundation for strengthening 
corporate transparency.98   
LEGISLATIVE REFORMS: 
2015 PSC reforms to the Companies 
Act 2006 and regulations governing 
limited partnerships in Scotland, need 
to be complemented by reforms that 
tackle the ownership structures of 
English, Welsh and Northern Irish 
Limited Partnerships. There is also a 
need to tackle financial transparency 
loopholes, that for instance allow SLPs 
to avoid financial reporting. Finally, there 
is a need to remove the 25% threshold 
required for declaring a PSC, a loophole 
that is being exploited to circumvent 
transparency requirements. 
REGULATING INTERMEDIARIES:
Steps must be taken to prevent law firms 
and company formation agents from 
operating in the UK or offshore, which 
provide company formation and nominee 
services in a high-risk manner.
98 ‘On Global Witness The Companies We Keep: What the UK’s Open Data Register Actually Tells Us About Company Ownership, Global Witness, 2018, available online: 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/companies-we-keep(accessed 15 April 2019) 
99 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Limited Partnerships: Reforms of Limited Partnership Law, 2018, available online: https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/762849/government-response-limited-partnerships.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019); 
Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation on Options to Enhance the Role of Companies 
House and Increase the Transparency of UK Corporate Entities, 2019, available online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/799662/Corporate_transparency_and_register_reform.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019)
RECOMMENDATIONS TO POLICY MAKERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
This investigation into the Akfa-Artel group and its founder, again, demonstrates how businesses globally 
draw on the United Kingdom’s lax system of corporate compliance, to build opaque legal structures. While 
some progress has been made in improving transparency requirements, critical loopholes remain. For 
example, there is a notable lack of enforcement. What exists in effect is a system of self-regulation. Those 
who choose to disobey the law currently face no risk of sanction, and minimal risk of detection. It also 
important that certain company formation agents enjoy impunity while providing legal entities and nominees, 
that allow their customers to frustrate global efforts to improve corporate transparency and disclosure. 
Based off the evidence there is a need for progress on the following fronts:
Recent and ongoing public consultations in the UK related to corporate transparency 
are welcomed, and may lead to important reforms that partially or fully address the 
above concerns.99  
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO POLICY MAKERS IN SINGAPORE
OPEN AND TRANSPARENT REGISTER
Singapore is currently moving against 
the global tide when it comes to 
corporate transparency. As a business 
and financial hub with a lax corporate 
disclosure regime, Singapore is setting 
itself up as an enduring beacon for 
money launderers, organised crime 
and kleptocrats, as other jurisdictions 
tighten their regimes. It is apparent in 
the case of Akfa-Artel, key entities are 
using Singapore as an offshore location, 
where it can operate without declaring 
persons/entities with significant control. 
It is essential that Singapore reforms its 
laws, so that registered legal entities 
must publicly disclose persons with 
significant control. Singapore should 
also look to strengthen the accessibility 
of corporate disclosure information by 
removing paywalls. 
 
Based off the evidence there is a need for progress on the following fronts:
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